[*88] In June 2025, the Supreme Court declined to recognize an implied right to sue for excessive force against federal prison personnel under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.1 The case began in Lee County, Virginia, where the plaintiff, Andrew Fields, was placed in solitary confinement at the United States Penitentiary with periodic checks from prison staff.2 According to Fields, âofficials would physically abuse him . . . during their periodic checks.â3 As a result, Fields filed suit for excessive force in violation of his constitutional rights in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia. The District Court dismissed the claim, holding that Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. [*89] 388 (1971) did not permit a âdamages remedy . . . for claims of excessive force by BOP officers against an inmate.â4
Fields appealed to the Fourth Circuit, which then reversed the initial dismissal of Fieldsâ claims by the District Court.5 The Fourth Circuit claimed the District Courtâs use of Bivens had been inappropriate, and that damages for Eighth Amendment violations were available.6 The majority opinion was based on the courtâs finding that no adequate alternative cause for damages existed.7 Since Fields was denied a standard grievance process within the prison,8 the Fourth Circuit held that this excessive force violation, combined with the lack of alternative remedies, would support a remedy for the Eighth Amendment under Bivens.
Judge Julius Richardson dissented from the Fourth Circuitâs decision.9 He wrote that âa faithful applicationâ of the Fourth Circuitâs precedent and âthe [*90] Supreme Courtâs leads squarely to the conclusion that [the Circuit Court] cannot create a new Bivens action here.â10 Additionally, Judge Richardson explained that the Court should defer to lawmakers to handle remedy and cause of action for constitutional violations, as opposed to engaging in judicial activism by stretching Bivens beyond its existing meaning to create new precedent.11
Goldey appealed the Fourth Circuitâs ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court sided with the District Courtâs opinion, rejecting the use of Bivens for Eighth Amendment violations and reiterating that the recognition of new causes of action through Bivens is disfavored.12
The outcome of this case may significantly impact the future of Bivens. The Supreme Court reinforced that Congress should control the remedies for areas that are not clearly governed by Bivens, signaling that it is unlikely for Bivens to expand beyond its original purpose. Extending protections under Bivens for excessive force could have led to negative consequences on prison operations.13 Additionally, this extension could have increased litigation against federal personnel, resulting in [*91] higher financial responsibilities for the government. Therefore, the Courtâs decision to prevent expansion of Bivens precluded these negative consequences and confirms that alternative, though less productive,14 methods must be pursued for damages,15 such as utilizing grievance processes through the Bureau of Prisons. Above all, this case demonstrates a recent shift away from judicial activism and leaves the important task of creating permanent statutory causes of action for monetary damages16 to Congress.17
- Goldey v. Fields, No. 24-809, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 30, 2025) (âIn Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), this Court recognized an implied cause of action for damages against federal officers for certain alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment. The Court subsequently recognized two additional contexts where implied Bivens causes of action were permitted, neither of which was an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim. After 1980, we have declined more than 10 times to extend Bivens to cover other constitutional violations. Those many post-1980 Bivens âcases have made clear that, in all but the most unusual circumstances, prescribing a cause of action is a job for Congress, not the courts.â Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482, 486 (2022). Despite those precedents, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit permitted the plaintiff here to maintain an Eighth Amendment excessive-force Bivens claim for damages against federal prison officials. For the past 45 years, this Court has consistently declined to extend Bivens to new contexts. See Egbert, 596 U. S., at 490â491. We do the same here.â). â©ïž
- Id. (âLee County, Virginia, ordered that plaintiff Andrew Fields be placed in solitary confinement. Prison officials monitored Fields while he was isolated.â). â©ïž
- Id. (citing Fields v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 109 F. 4th 264, 268 (CA4 2024)) (âFields alleges that during their periodic checks, officials would âphysically abuseâ him.â). â©ïž
- Id. at 2 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a; also id., at 45aâ54a) (âThe U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed Fieldsâs complaint. As relevant here, the court determined that Fields lacked a cause of action under Bivens. Because âthe Supreme Court has never ruled that a damages remedy exists for claims of excessive force by BOP officers against an inmate,â the District Court had âno difficulty in concluding that these claims arise in a new contextâ and that a Bivens remedy was unavailable.â). â©ïž
- Id. at 2 (â[T]he Fourth Circuit reversed . . .â). â©ïž
- Id. at 2 (citing Fields v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 109 F. 4th 264, 270 (CA4 2024)) (âIn a divided decision, the Fourth Circuit reversed in relevant part, concluding that Fields could proceed with his Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim for damages. The Court of Appeals determined that no âspecial factors counseled against extending Bivensâ here.â). â©ïž
- Fields v. Goldey, No. 23-6246, slip op. at 6 (4th Cir. July 25, 2024) (ââAlthough § 1983 gives plaintiffs the statutory authority to sue state officials for money damages for constitutional violations, there is no statutory counterpart to sue federal officials.â Mays v. Smith, 70 F.4th 198, 201 (4th Cir. 2023). If they are to proceed at all, plaintiffs suing federal-officer defendants must proceed under an implied cause of action first established by the Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics[,] 403 U.S. 388 (1971).â). â©ïž
- Id. at 5 (âFollowing his time in the SHU, Fields attempted to utilize the Bureau of Prisonsâ (BOPâs) administrative grievance procedure, but prison staff denied him access to the necessary forms. J.A. 24, 26. He was thus unable to pursue any alternative remedies.â). â©ïž
- Goldey v. Fields, No. 24-809, slip op. at 2 (U.S. June 30, 2025) (âIn a divided decision, the Fourth Circuit reversed in relevant part . . .â). â©ïž
- Id. at 2 (âJudge Richardson dissented and stated: âA faithful application of our precedent and the Supreme Court's leads squarely to the conclusion that we cannot create a new Bivens action here.ââ). â©ïž
- Fields v. Goldey, No. 23-6246, slip op. at 22 (4th Cir. July 25, 2024) (âCourts must cautiously defer to the nationâs lawmakers, who enjoy the principalâperhaps soleâauthority to invent new legal causes of action for constitutional violations.â). â©ïž
- Goldey v. Fields, No. 24-809, slip op. at 2 (U.S. June 30, 2025) (citing Egbert, 596 U.S. at 491) (âThis Court has repeatedly emphasized that ârecognizing a cause of action under Bivens is âa disfavored judicial activity.âââ). â©ïž
- Id. at 3 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84â85 (1987)) (âIn addition, extending Bivens to allow an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force could have negative systemic consequences for prison officials and the âinordinately difficult undertakingâ of running a prison.â). â©ïž
- Id. at 3 (citing Egbert, 596 U.S. at 498) (âThe existence of such alternative remedial procedures counsels against allowing Bivens suits even if such âprocedures are ânot as effective as an individual damages remedy.âââ). â©ïž
- Id. at 3 (citing Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. 120, 137 (2017)) (âMoreover, âan alternative remedial structureâ already exists for aggrieved federal prisoners.â). â©ïž
- Id. at 3 (citing Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 148â 149) (â. . . Congress has actively legislated in the area of prisoner litigation but has not enacted a statutory cause of action for money damages.â). â©ïž
- Id. at 1 (citing Egbert, 596 U.S. at 486) (â[P]rescribing a cause of action is a job for Congress, not the courts.â). â©ïž